By Erica Shelley Nelson and Brennen Johnson
In City of Medina v. Skinner, the Washington Court of Appeals, Division I, determined that the Civil Service Commission lacks the authority to award back pay for wrongful terminations or suspensions. The City of Medina asked the State Court system for relief from a Commission decision in which the Commission modified the discipline of a Medina Police Lieutenant and specifically awarded him back pay and benefits at a pay scale starting from the time when he would have returned from the modified suspension. The Court determined that the Commission lacked the authority to award back pay and overruled the Commission’s decision, as far as it ordered the City to pay the former Lieutenant.
In 2006, Lieutenant Roger Skinner was terminated from his position with the City of Medina Police Department for violating department standards. He appealed the dismissal to the Civil Service Commission and, nearly seven years after the termination occurred, the Commission found that there was just cause for some discipline and the City acted in good faith, but lacked just cause to terminate him. The Commission then modified the termination to a 60-day suspension without pay and an accompanying demotion to patrol officer. Additionally, the Commission ordered that the former lieutenant was entitled to back pay and benefits beginning from when the suspension would have ended until the date that his health prevented him from returning to work.
The City applied to State Court for relief from the decision, claiming that the Commission exceeded its authority when it modified the Lieutenant’s discipline and awarded him back pay as a remedy. It argued that state law specifically authorizes the Commission to grant back pay and retroactively reinstate an employee who was discharged for political or religious reasons, or without cause, but precludes back pay when the discipline is only modified. The Lieutenant argued that by granting the Commission authority to modify discipline and reinstate officers, the state law implicitly grants the Commission authority to award back pay.
The Court rejected both of these arguments, reasoning that the statute neither implicitly prevents retroactive reinstatement when modifying disciplinary actions nor implicitly authorizes the Commission to grant back pay. Instead, the Commission has only the authority specifically granted by the statute. Specifically, to “affirm, modify or reverse discipline… [and] set the period and dates for [an employee]’s suspension without pay.”
The Court further clarified its reasoning:
The statute provides the Commission with the authority to affirm, modify, or reverse discipline. It does not expressly authorize the commission to award damages or other remedies…Entitlement to pay or compensation for reinstatement, after a period of suspension without pay, flows from the employment contract and any modification to the employee’s classification, grade, or pay, not from this statute.
Applying this reasoning to the specific facts of the case, the Court said:
Here, the employer’s original discipline was effective February 16, 2006. The Commission correctly noted that the 60 day suspension ended on April 16, 2006. On April 17, 2006 Skinner was reinstated just as if the city had imposed only a 60 day suspension and demotion in the first place. He was entitled from that point forward to the benefits of his employment, not by virtue of an award of back pay by the Commission, but by virtue of his employment agreement… If the City does not honor its employment compensation obligations to Skinner, his remedy is in court, not before the commission.
Ultimately, the Court affirmed the former lieutenant’s 60 day suspension with reinstatement according to the dates set by the Commission. However, it granted the City’s request for relief as far as the Commission asserted authority to control the determination of the former Lieutenant’s remedy and damages flowing from the City’s conduct.
I am not convinced this case was decided correctly. The statute at issue clearly provides that if the officer’s removal was not in good faith for cause, the Commission shall order immediate reinstatement or reemployment and may in its discretion, award pay or compensation from the time of the “removal.” Even if there was just cause to suspend the Lieutenant for 60-days, the City did not have just cause to terminate him. As a result, under the express terms of the statute, the Commission did indeed have the authority to award back pay when the City did not have just cause to terminate him.
