The Availability of Other Options besides Resignation is Not Dispositive in a Wrongful Constructive Discharge Claim

By Anthony Rice

In Barnett v. Sequim Valley Ranch, the court upheld a $427,230 jury award for the plaintiffs and former employees of Sequim Valley Ranch. The court held that the plaintiffs’ constructive, wrongful discharge suit was timely filed, and the trial court properly instructed the jury on the elements of a wrongful constructive discharge claim.

The plaintiffs all worked for many years at Sequim Valley Ranch, a lavender farm and ranch owned by Clapp. In the spring of 2004, Clapp began asking the plaintiffs to participate in a lawsuit against a neighboring dairy farm. Clapp believed that farm was excessively fertilizing its property and this constituted a health hazard and safety risk that threatened his lavender business. The plaintiffs thought the lawsuit against the neighboring dairy farm was meritless. Despite the plaintiffs’ beliefs, Clapp repeatedly threatened the plaintiffs with termination if they did not perjurer their testimony to support the meritless lawsuit. As a result, the four long-time employees tendered a single letter of resignation on September 18, 2004. The letter noted that, by asking to commit perjury or be fired, Clapp, in effect, constructively discharged the plaintiffs.

Clapp first argued that the plaintiffs’ suit was time barred. Clapp argued that the date should be September 14, 2004, the day the plaintiffs were interviewed by Clapp’s counsel and the last day they were physically present at the ranch. The Court held that this argument was unpersuasive because “[w]hether we look to the day the employees gave notice of their termination (September 20, 2004) or their last day of work (September 18, 2004), the employees clearly filed their wrongful discharge claim on September 17, 2007, within three years of the statute of limitations.”

Next Clapp argued that the lower court erred when it refused to instruct the jury that the plaintiffs must prove that they had no alternative but to quit their jobs. The court held that an employee does not need to show there were no other alternatives. Instead,

an employee “must prove [her employer] deliberately made working conditions intolerable for her; that a `reasonable person in her position’ would be forced to quit; that she did quit because of the conditions and not for any other reason; and that she suffered damage as a result of being forced to quit” . . . Accordingly, [Clapp]’s claim lacks merit.