The Washington Supreme Court held that the religious non-profit organization exemption set forth in the Washington Law Against Discrimination’s (WLAD) definition of “employer” does not violate the state privileges and immunities clause, and does not implicate the State’s establishment clause.
In Brownfield v. City of Yakima, the Washington Court of Appeals, Division III, found that Yakima police officer Oscar Brownfield, fired for insubordination in 2007, failed to support his claim that he was actually fired because of a disability. The Court held that his refusal to submit to a fitness for duty examination, not the disability that led to the examination requested was the proximate cause of the discharge.
The law requires employers to make “reasonable accommodations” for individuals with disabilities to perform their jobs. Identifying and implementing those accommodations can be tricky sometimes as it requires an individualized assessment of the nature of the disability and the required job duties. Union representatives may be called upon to assist in this process.
As a case of first impression, a Washington State District Court recently found, in Hansen v. Boeing Co., that an employee is protected against retaliation for requesting or utilizing reasonable accommodation for a disability under the Washington State Law Against Discrimination (WSLAD).
In Ockletree v. Franciscan Health Systems, 27 AD Cases 442 (W.D. Wash. 2012), a Washington federal district court refused to dismiss the plaintiff’s ADA claims against a religious hospital when the discriminatory action was not religiously motivated. Whether the religious exemption under the Washington Law against Discrimination (WLAD) applied to non-religious based discriminatory firings by religious institutions is currently an unanswered question in Washington. Although there was no actual record that the claims had been timely filed, the SOL may have been longer if the WLAD did apply to this claim, so dismissal for untimely firing could not be decided at this point. The court dismissed the plaintiff’s discharge in violation of public policy claim, holding that the statutory remedies were sufficient and therefore precluded a common-law claim.
