Florida Chief of Police’s Statements Not Protected By First Amendment

By: Loyd Willaford and Clive Pontusson

In Santarlas v. City of Coleman, a federal court ruled that a Chief of Police who was tasked with securing funding for the Department and complained about misuse of public funds was speaking as part of his job duties, not as a private citizen. As a result, the Chief’s speech was not protected by the First Amendment and he could not sue the City for violating his constitutional rights.

Thomas Santarlas was a reserve officer and acting Chief of Police in Coleman, Florida. As part of his official duties, he was tasked with writing and managing financial grants for the Department. Santarlas claimed that the Mayor and other parts of the City government attempted to thwart his efforts to procure funding and supplies for the Department. He complained about this to the mayor and to the State’s Attorney’s Office. Following an unpleasant confrontation, the Mayor dismissed Santarlas and disbanded the Police Department. The Mayor then contracted with the local Sheriff to provide for the City’s law enforcement needs.

Santarlas argued that speech about government mismanagement was always speech that was protected by the First Amendment, since this issue would be of concern to the public. Santarlas argued that he was making this speech as a citizen, not as a public employee. To support that argument, he pointed to the fact that he complained outside of normal business hours, often used his home computer and wore civilian clothes when meeting with City officials.

The City argued that Santarlas did not deserve the protection of the First Amendment because he was not speaking on a matter of public concern, and moreover he was speaking as a public employee, not a citizen. The City also argued that Santarlas could not show “a policy or custom of retaliation.” The City also argued that since the mayor was acting in his official capacity when he fired Santarlas, the Mayor was entitled to qualified immunity.

The Court agreed with the City that Santarlas’ statements were not entitled to First Amendment protection. The Court applied a standard two-step test to determine if a public employee’s speech is protected by the First Amendment:

The first requires determining whether the employee spoke as a citizen on a matter of public concern. If the answer is no, the employee has no First Amendment cause of action… If the answer is yes, then the possibility of a First Amendment claim arises. The question becomes whether the relevant government entity had an adequate justification for treating the employee differently from any other member of the general public.

Here, the court was satisfied that the answer at the first step was “no.” Santarlas was speaking about funding issues, because that was part of his official duties. He was doing so because he had a professional interest in securing more funding. He was not speaking as a citizen and had not established that his intention was to make this information available to the general public. In defining “public concern,” the court relied on a higher court’s decision that:

The relevant inquiry is not whether the public would be interested in the topic of the speech at issue but rather whether the purpose of the plaintiff’s speech was to raise issues of public concern.

The Court believed it was obvious that Santarla’s main reason for speaking was his own frustration, not a desire to raise awareness of the issue. Because the facts supported this conclusion, the Court was not required to analyze the other arguments and dismissed Santarla’s lawsuit.

This case is a good example of an unsuccessful First Amendment case.  Courts have held  that speech within the workplace on work-related topics is not entitled to First Amendment protections, because this would hamper the ability of government employers to manage their affairs.  In this case, the Court easily found that Santalaras’ role as police chief and the topics and circumstances  he alleges he was retaliated against for speaking about: complaints about budgetary issues with City Officials,  meant that this speech was not entitled him to First Amendment protection.  The Court went on to note that there are other remedies available for those who complain about government malfeasance within the workplace.  These remedies include state and federal whistleblower protection statutes. 

Washington State has statutes on this topic:  RCW  42.40 (state government) and RCW 42.41 (local government).  The state government statute is fairly robust, but the local government statute has very short time period for bringing claims and there is a very specific procedure which must be followed.  Local government whistle blowers who are fired from their job may also have a claim for discharge in violation of public policy.

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