By Jordan L. Jones
In Jensen v. Lincoln County, the Washington Court of Appeals, Division Three (Appeals Court) held that a County Crusher Foreman (Grievant) was not entitled to compensation for the time he spent driving to job sites. The Appeals Court found that the time the Grievant spent commuting to work did not fall under the definition of “hours worked” as defined by the Washington Department of Labor and Industries (DLI).
The Grievant worked with a mobile rock crusher. The Grievant alleged that he should be compensated for the time he spent travelling between the county shop and the crusher site.
The Court noted that the CBA “explicitly . . . [provided] that the eight hour work day . . . [did] ‘not include travel time to and from the work site’ . . . [but] the CBA . . . [did] require the county to furnish the crew with transportation to and from the work site.” The Court found that along with being provided a $150 monthly travel allowance, the Grievant and his co-workers were allowed to use a vehicle to go from the county shop to a given work site.
The Appeals Court was asked to determine “whether the time that . . . [the Grievant] spends travelling between the county shop and the crushing site is compensable under Washington’s Minimum Wage Act, chapter 49.46 RCW.” The Appeals Court stated that “hours worked” was defined by the DLI as “all hours during which the employee is authorized or required by the employer to be on duty on the employer’s premises or at a prescribed work place.” See WAC 296-126-002(8).
The Appeals Court found that (1) the county did not require the Grievant to use its vehicle at the shop to go to job sites; (2) the county vehicle was a bargained-for benefit for the Employees; and (3) the Grievant has a prescribed place of work which is the crusher site and he is not an Employee on call.
[The Grievant] is not “on duty” during his daily commute, and that the county provided SUV is not part of . . . [the Grievant’s] “proscribed place of work.” It simply does not function as the equivalent of a mobile office or job site. Accordingly, the time that . . . [the Grievant] spends commuting does not fall within the definition of “hours worked.”
The Appeals Court affirmed the trial court’s decision.
Editor’s Note [Erica Shelley Nelson]: This decision again reaffirms the principal that, unlike an on-call employee, or an employee who travels to varying job sites during the day, an employee who has a prescribed workplace is not entitled to compensation for commuting to work.
